A close examination of an understudied European Union member state such as Romania reveals that since 1989, post-communist state and non-state actors have adopted a wide range of methods, processes, and practices of working through the communist past. Both the timing and the sequencing of these transitional justice methods prove to be significant in determining the efficacy of addressing and redressing the crimes of 1945-1989. In addition, there is evidence that some of these methods have directly facilitated the democratization process, while the absence of other methods has undermined the rule of law. This is the first volume to overview the complex Romanian transitional justice effort by accessing secret archives and investigating court trials of former communist perpetrators, lustration, compensation and rehabilitation, property restitution, the truth commission, the rewriting of history books, and unofficial truth projects. It details the political negotiations that have led to the adoption of relevant legislation and assesses these processes in terms of their timing, sequencing, and impact on democratization.
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1 Although Nicolae Ceauşescu briefly pursued a course of relative liberalization after he came to power in 1965, he soon abandoned it and plunged the country back under increasingly harsh rule.
2 Ceauşescu's nearly quarter-century as First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) came to an ignominious end in 1989 when he and his wife were forced to flee Bucharest on December 22 amid widening popular unrest and violent instability. The two of them were quickly captured in Târgovişte and then executed by firing squad on Christmas Day after a perfunctory trial.
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The violent upheavals that led to the Ceauşescus' downfall resulted in extensive bloodshed, but the large majority of casualties in Romania in December 1989 and early January 1990 -a total of more than 1,100 deaths and 3,350 injuries -occurred after Ceauşescu and his wife had fled and were no longer in a position to control any of the forces engaging in armed clashes.
3 Precisely who ordered the use of deadly force on such a massive scale has never been clarified.
Lavinia Stan is an ideal person to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the official and unofficial efforts in post-1989 Romania to come to grips with the crimes and abuses of the communist era. Not only has she published several excellent books about political and social changes in Romania since 1989; she has also been at the cutting edge of scholarship exploring the conceptual and practical dimensions of transitional justice (the diverse set of measures intended to achieve redress for egregious human rights abuses) in the former communist world. Stan's in-depth research on this topic led to the publication in 2009 of Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past (of which she was editor and chief author) and will also be the basis for the forthcoming publication by Cambridge University Press of the Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, a landmark three-volume compendium that Stan coedited with Nadya Nedelsky. In these groundbreaking studies, Stan combines social science methods with extensive fieldwork to address questions that not only are of great scholarly importance but also affect the everyday lives of people residing in the former communist states. The combination of methodological rigor with empirical richness makes Stan's work on transitional justice in former Warsaw Pact countries, especially Romania, stand out.
In the current book, Stan brings together her major areas of expertise -the political and social dynamics of post-1989 Romania, and the theoretical and empirical aspects of transitional justice in former authoritarian states -to produce a splendid analysis of the challenges of transitional justice in a country that has only sporadically shed its authoritarian past. After Ceauşescu's ouster at the end of 1989, many observers both inside and outside Romania were hopeful that democratization would take hold in Romania and that the country might, for the first time in its history, have a chance of moving toward Western standards of openness, accountability, and democratic governance. Despite the damage inflicted by some forty-five years of communist rule, the idea was that, with the Ceauşescus finally gone, Romanian pro-democracy activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would grow in numbers and influence. In due course, they would gain sufficient strength to pull Romania firmly away from its dictatorial past. Some individuals and groups in Romania did seek to promote liberal democracy after 1989, but the basic obstacle they confronted was that the political leaders who removed Ceauşescu and who gained control of Romania's polity were former highranking communist officials, most of whom had worked loyally under the Ceauşescu regime. The new leader of the country, Ion Iliescu, had been one of Ceauşescu's closest aides until the early 1970s, when the two men had a falling-out. Iliescu thereafter was gradually deprived of his posts in the RCP's ruling organs and was assigned to relatively obscure ministerial posts. As the head of the ruling National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvȃrii Naţionale, or FSN) that took over in the wake of Ceauşescu's departure, Iliescu pledged to reform Romania's communist system, but not to dismantle it. 4 He and other leading FSN officials called for the near-term adoption of "original democracy" in Romania that would keep most of the basic elements of the communist system in place.
Subsequently, after consolidating his power via the FSN in the May 1990 parliamentary elections, Iliescu formed his own National Salvation Democratic Front, which he later renamed the Party of Social Democracy and then the Social Democratic Party. In keeping with practices of the communist era, Iliescu used thuggish, extralegal violence in June 1990 to bolster his power in the face of popular unrest, and he continued to rely on unaccountable security organs to silence and intimidate opponents. Iliescu gained easy reelection as president in late 1992, enabling him to extend his domination of Romania's polity, including its treatment of the past. Hopes of meaningful democratization were stymied during the seven years that Romania languished under his rule in the 1990s.
5 After he lost his bid for a third presidential term in November 1996, Romania did make significant progress toward greater openness and accountability under Emil Constantinescu, but renewed political turmoil facilitated Iliescu's return to power in the December 2000 presidential election, giving him another four-year term. Romania managed to gain admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2002-2004, even though NATO officials were well aware of Iliescu's unsavory past. In 2007, a few years after Iliescu left office for good, Romania was granted entry into the European Union (EU).
Nevertheless, despite having gained membership in both NATO and the EU, Romania (along with Bulgaria) remained an outlier in the former Soviet bloc, a country plagued by the lingering residue of the communist era. In these circumstances, attempts by the Romanian government to make a reckoning with the crimes of the communist regime were mostly stillborn, especially during Iliescu's presidency in the 1990s. Prominent holdovers from the Ceauşescu era, who were present at all levels of the political, judicial, and security structures, had no interest in embarking on a thorough, no-holds-barred investigation of past misdeeds or in pursuing redress and justice for victims of the communist regime. Nor were the authorities inclined to disclose the identities of Securitate officers or the names of the hundreds of thousands of informants (informatori) and collaborators (colaboratori) who secretly aided the Securitate's repressive apparatus. To the extent that the Romanian government took any punitive action against those responsible for communist-era atrocities, this was done mostly as a way of settling political scores or deflecting pressure "from below" (i.e., from NGOs and activists) for far more sweeping action. Much the same was true about attempts to provide compensation to some of the victims of communist repression. Such measures had to be pushed forward by activists outside the government, often over the objections of senior officials, members of parliament, and judges.
In a series of fascinating thematic chapters, Stan explores every dimension of transitional justice in post-Ceauşescu Romania -judicial and nonjudicial, official and unofficial, local and countrywide, national and international. She shows that in one or two areas, notably the removal of symbols of the communist regime (e.g., the ubiquitous portraits of Ceauşescu, the statues of leading communist figures, sundry objects adorned with the hammer-and-sickle or with the RCP's insignia and flags) and the renaming of streets, bridges, and buildings, the Romanian government did act relatively swiftly to make a break with the past. But in almost all other areas, such as the proposed overhaul of the state security sector, the rewriting of history books for public schools, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, the construction of new public symbols (including statues, memorials, and museums dedicated to the victims of communism), lustration, the initiation of judicial proceedings against the worst perpetrators of abuses and in support of victims, and the granting of access to secret police files, the Romanian authorities either were very slow to act or declined to do anything at all. Even when they did act, the steps they took rarely had much lasting effect. The impact was negligible in many cases because the resources allocated for the specific activities were too meager; in other cases the proclaimed measures were never actually put into effect. Programs initiated by NGOs and other groups outside the government made up part of the gap, but some of these programs (e.g., an unofficial trial of the RCP, the scattered naming of Securitate officers) had very little impact and were never sufficient to make up for the woeful lag in transitional justice in the first half of the 1990s.
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Moreover, as Stan shows, the task was complicated because Romania after 1989 had three distinct periods for which transitional justice was needed: (1) the wartime years (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) when Romania was ruled by a brutal, pro-Nazi regime; (2) the period from 1944 to 1989 when Romania was ruled by a communist dictatorship; and (3) the revolution and bloodshed of December 1989. For various reasons the third period commanded highest priority for the Romanian authorities, many of whom stood to benefit personally from their participation (real or otherwise) on the side of the revolution. Because the violence was clearly etched in people's memories, and because the victims were active in seeking redress, the 1989 revolution tended to dominate the agenda for official transitional justice programs (especially during Iliescu's initial two terms), often at the expense of attempts to remedy injustices that occurred during the earlier periods.
Stan's wide-ranging survey of the different elements of transitional justice in Romania underscores the large number of actors who have been involved. Political leaders, bureaucrats, legislators, and judges have been supplemented (and often outdone) by NGOs, victims' groups, religious denominations, and international organizations such as the EU, NATO, the European Council, and the European Court of Human Rights. The presidential truth commission that was set up in 2006 under Vladimir Tismaneanu played an important and salutary role in the process, compiling a detailed report about the atrocities perpetrated by the communist regime. 6 The impact of the report may have been ephemeral, but it amassed evidence that could not easily be glossed over. Institutes that were established to investigate communist crimes and to study the Romanian exile (the institutes were merged in 2009-2010) also were centrally involved in transitional justice efforts, including exhumations and forensic investigations as well as historical research. Foreword xiv allows readers to ponder key questions about the reciprocal connection between democratization and transitional justice and the means by which former authoritarian countries can remedy past abuses and overcome the baleful legacy they have inherited. Stan's discussion of fundamental issues, including whether democratization is likely to facilitate transitional justice (and vice versa), whether some methods of transitional justice are more conducive than others to democratization, and whether some instruments of transitional justice may actually stymie democratization, will be of broad interest to political scientists in several fields: comparative politics, political theory, and international relations.
A sizable literature has emerged over the past two decades about specific elements of transitional justice in Romania and other former communist countries, but Stan's book is the first attempt to bring these far-flung strands together into a coherent whole. It is an ambitious task, but Stan passes with flying colors. She has produced a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the obstacles, tribulations, setbacks, and occasional successes in the pursuit of transitional justice in Romania. Her book is a model for all future studies of transitional justice in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.
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